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“Fire sales – what can be done about them?” 




1.  Introduction 
 
At least since the financial crisis that started in 2008, our financial system is more and more 
thought of, in a critical way. The effects that a crash of the financial system would have on the real 
economy would now be bigger than ever. This is due to the fact that even the real economy is 
financed more and more through credit. However, the financial system before 2008 was the 
riskiest it ever was because of its very high levels of leverage. This leverage, and the lending 
connected to it, has increased the interdependence and complexity if the financial system to an 
extent that hardly any major player’s action would not have a direct effect on other players. This 
has lead to systemic risk, of which fire sales are a perfect example. The system of creditors, 
arbitrageurs and the “providers” of financial products cannot be understood anymore to an extent 
that would be enough to be able to assess the real risk of an investment. Thus, irrational emotions 
such as “hope” and “fear” are the determinants of a lot of behaviour on the financial market. The 
fear of further losses after a slight decrease in the value of an asset can cause the creditor to 
increase the margin of an arbitrageur, leaving him illiquid and thus forced to see the assets 
quickly. The following decrease in price will have the same effect for other traders, leading to a 
systemic risk. 
 
Systemic risk has traditionally been excluded by economic theories such as the arbitrary 
pricing theory, totally ignoring the fact of the feedback of one’s own actions on others in the 
context of a highly complex network. The “too big to fail” phenomenon has also risen in the last 
decades, as some financial institutions increase continuously in size. If an institution reaches a 
certain size, its failure would imply consequences for most other agents in the system, that would 
lead to a collapse of the system resulting in a stop in the supply of money. The modern state and   3
the modern economy depends highly on the availability of capital, therefore the financial system 
must not collapse. Even smaller events, such as fire sales of certain asset classes resulting in a 
breakdown of a specific market can have enormous effects and lead eventually into a liquidity 
crisis, then affecting the real economy negatively. 
  
In a world where wide parts of the real economy depend on the availability of capital, the 
question arises, of how such a system risk, endangering the welfare of millions of people could be 
controlled? Or how the negative effects of an ongoing fire sale could be reduced to a minimum?  
This essay tries to show different explanations for fire sales in the financial market and shows 
several possibilities, how fire sales could be dealt with. First it is going to give an introduction to 
fire sales, especially of financial assets, then presenting the different policy options. At the end, a 
conclusion will be drawn, trying to answer the question if fire sales which are extremely complex 
and depends on a million factors could be controlled by the government and what the implications 
of such a control might be. The essay is not looking at empirical data of fire sales but rather 
approaching the topic from an argumentative and theoretical point of view. The essay will also not 
cover the question if a single government would even be able to regulate the financial system to an 
extent that it would actually make a difference, or if a group of important governments, or even all 
major government would need to work together in order to be effective and make a real 
difference.  
 
2.  Fire sales 
 
“A bank that simply suffers large losses may be forced to reduce its risk by selling 
assets at distressed or fire-sale prices. If other banks must revalue their assets at 
these temporarily low market values, the first sale can set off a cascade of fire sales 
that inflicts losses on many institutions. Thus, whether through defaults or fire sales, 
one troubled bank can damage many others, reducing the financial system’s capacity 
to bear risk and make loans.” 
 
A fire sale is basically a sale, which is not carried out voluntarily but forced, and the asset is 
very often sold at a dislocated price. Generally it must be differentiated between fire sales of real 
assets and fire sales of financial assets. The obligation to sell, results from the seller’s need to pay   4
back the credit. In this case, the payment can only be done through selling assets. The potential 
buyers are normally also selling assets in a similar fashion as the original seller in order to 
minimise the risk of losses. Therefore, the price is dislocated, as they themselves are indebted and 
not able to buy the assets sold. Then, assets are bought by non-specialists who do not buy assets at 
a normally set price, having conscience about the lack of their own speciality in these assets. 
Assets might then also be bought by arbitrageurs who are speculating on the rise of the assets and 
also a stabilisation of the market. 
  
A fire sale of financial assets is normally carried out in a way that a certain bank, investment 
bank, hedge fund or other holder of assets starts selling a certain asset or assets of a specific kind 
all at the same time. At the beginning of the fire sale, prices that are roughly at the same level as 
the prices were before the fire sale decision are achieved. As the market realised the over-supply 
of these assets, the price drops rapidly as the number of potential buyers decreases as well.  
 
Fire sales often lead to strong reductions in asset prices. The prices of similar assets also 
decline very often, as the sellers of these assets are afraid of an “infection” and therefore 
sometimes panic and try to sell these assets before everyone else does to avoid big losses. This 
fear of “infection” then leads to an actual infection and thus the fire sales can turn out to be a 
systemic risk, “infecting” more and more assets and potentially leading to a total market crash 
with a total excess of supply and hardly any buyers leading to a massive drop in asset prices. This 
generally involves big losses for a wide group of investors. Fire sales have not been the only cause 
of the financial crisis but have surely contributed to the general market failure a big deal.  
 
Collateralised lending is the force that facilitates fire sales the most. This includes fire sales 
of real assets as well as financial assets. This type of lending includes collateral as hedging of a 
loan by using a specific property as a security. This security is used to ensure repayment of the 
loan because if the loan is not repaid, the lender has the right to liquidise the collateral. This might 
be done very quickly for various reasons. Debt could be modelled as a contract that allows the 
creditor to supervise the cash flows of the borrower and in the case of default of the loan, the cash 
shifts into the lenders property. Thus, an asset fire sale is sale were high-valuation buyers are not 
capable of buying shares because of the debt overhang problems occurring simultaneously. For 
example, a company borrows money to finance an asset such as a bus. The bus is then used by the   5
entrepreneur to generate cash flows. The best way to structure the debt would be to have a 
combination of short-term and long-term senior debt, which is then collateralised by the asset, in 
this case the bus. So, if the project turns out to be bad, the lender can sell the bus, this can also be 
fixed in the contract. 
  
The market asset is then sold in consists of specialist and non-specialist buyers. In the case 
of the bus, the specialist buyers would be other bus companies and the non-specialist buyers 
would be an investor who buys the bus to lease it to other bus companies. These non-specialist 
buyers have lower valuations of the asset then the specialist buyers. The key point in this is that 
the specialist buyer does not buy the asset because it itself might be financially constraint. 
Therefore, he is unable to bid at the exact time when the asset is sold.
, 
  
This however raises the question of why the creditor and borrower do not negotiate again 
about the cash rather then transferring the asset to the lender? And thus, why does the lender not 
hold on to the asset, once he repossesses it, until the condition for liquidation has improved? 
Generally speaking, it is everyone’s interest to avoid a fire sale. However, very often borrowers do 
not posses the liquidity needed to avoid a fire sale and for the time being, they cannot increase 
their capital as they are constrained by overhang from senior debt. Thus, if a high valuation buyer 
is not available, a fire sale is nearly impossible to avoid.  
 
2.1 Fire Sales of financial assets 
 
Although there is evidence of fire sales in real assets, fire sales of financial assets have much 
bigger effects because financial investors such as banks, investment banks or hedge funds are 
financed with money that can be removed very quickly. As a general example, demand deposits in 
banks could be used but also deposits in hedge funds can be removed quickly. Very often, 
commercial paper is used as a debt instrument, which has duration between a day and several 
months. That way, the credit needs to be continuously renewed. Also, investment banks and hedge 
funds started to use repurchase agreements, which are basically very short-term loans, which are 
then secured by longer-term loans. 
  
A severe problem for the financial investors are sudden stops in short-term financing which   6
can then lead to rows of liquidation of assets in order to obtain cash. This force to liquidate assets 
affects investors and their competitors. This was a central aspect of the financial crisis that started 
in 2008. An investor tries to acquire funds from outside and then bets against the mispricing of a 
security because, being an arbitrageur, hopes that it will vanish after a certain period of time. 
However, if the price dislocation proceeds or gets even worse, the arbitrageur loses money in the 
short term. Very often the outside investors who he got his loan from do not know if the losses of 
these assets are temporary or are simply a bad strategy and the price might not even be dislocated. 
If the outside investors lose confidence in the arbitrageur they very often decide to withdraw the 
money. In this case, the arbitrageur needs to acquire cash to pay back the creditors. He does that 
by reducing his positions even though holding his position or even increasing it would be very 
attractive. Problematic however is that the arbitrageur will not be the only one following a certain 
strategy. If a group of arbitrageurs are all confronted with fund withdrawals, all of them start to 
sell this particular asset. Thus, this lead to a increase in the mispricing which leads to more losses 
then self-reinforcing capital withdrawal and therefore leading to fire sales. The process only stops 
because at some point the marginal productivity decreases that much that selling the assets can be 
considered to reduce losses in any relevant way anymore. 
 
In the context of debt contracts, which are collateralised by securities, time-varying margins 
are important. In order to secure themselves from default, creditors ask borrowers to put in a 
margin. This means that they lend less than the full amount of the price of the collateral. In the 
case of the decrease of the market price, the creditors very often ask the borrowers to increase the 
collateral and therefore the margin are they ask for a return of some of the money. If the borrower 
is not able to get hold of this cash, the lender is likely to liquidate the collateral. This can on the 
one hand side lead to a fire sale because the value of the collateral declines. Then, the borrower 
cannot acquire the cash to maintain the loan and thus, the asset gets liquidated. On the other hand, 
it can also lead to a fire sale but in a different way. Margins can be determined endogenously. 
Price volatility can be increased by a negative shock to the collateral. Then lenders and investors 
try to move their margins back to an equilibrium, which again requires the borrower to find some 
new cash. Generally, margin calls, the call of an investor to increase the margin, are extreme 
destabilising and lead often to the liquidation of assets, as an increase in cash is needed. 
  
For example, a certain asset costs 100€ and the margin is 10. A certain arbitrageur uses 20€   7
of his own money and 80€ come from a credit. If the share then loses 15% of value and goes down 
to 85€, the net value is now only 5€. The asset can then either be sold or additional cash needs to 
be paid to the lender in this it must be 5€ at least so that the net value of the asset is over 10€ 
again. A decline in the funding liquidity occurs when security prices drop and at the same time 
margins go up. The then occurring fire sales make markets illiquid in the meaning that prices and 
values are diverging strongly. This phenomenon called market liquidity is influenced by the 
vicious cycle of falling prices, increasing margins, further fall in prices, an so one, the result being 
the total illiquidity of the market. Through the possibility of concentrating on portfolios of stacks 
that are hold by mutual funds at the beginning of a quarter, and knowing the returns because 
mutual funds report net values of the assets on a continuous basis, it is possible to predict which 
positions will be liquidated at the end of the quarter in the case of a poor performance of the funds. 
 
 
2.2 Policy implication 
 
Fire sales are part of the systemic risk in the financial market. It could event be argued that 
they are contributing to it significantly. Therefore, government policies that are capable of limiting 
fire sales or their externalities are essential to improve the economic wellbeing. Policies can be 
either designed to reduce the negative effects of an ongoing fire sale or even try to prevent the 
occurrence of a fire sale scenario. Examples for the latter are an increase in the “Capital cushions 
of financial firms and improvements in the plumbing of the financial system”. Also policies such 
as “mandating higher hair cuts and margins in derivative markets aim to stop the cycle of 
deleveraging and fire sales” even before they start. On the other hand there are polices that try to 
limit already ongoing fire sales. During ongoing fire sales, a lot of banks, investment banks or 
hedge funds are put aside as they are financially constrained and not able to access capital. On the 
one hand side, the government can lend banks against risky collateral and on the other hand the 
government can buy positions directly and “provide subsidies targeted at the purchasers of certain 
assets.”  
 
It is argued that capital injections into the financial market is more beneficial then the 
purchase of assets by the government since the government is not able to asses weather there is a 
true mispricing of the assets or if the fall in prices is just a movement towards the real equilibrium.   8
Thus, in the worst case, a government purchase of assets resulting in an actual mispricing of assets 
could therefore even result in losses. The positive results of liquidity injections into the financial 
market might on the other side not result in a relaxation of the situation. Banks might instead of 
engaging into new lending try to hold the newly acquired cash back or may buy assets leaving the 
prices below a level where new lending would be profitable. Furthermore, the provision of 
government funds could also be supporting institutions that eventually fail or lead to more risky 
investments as the institution assumes that it will be bailed out and could therefore afford to take 
more risk and thus increase its chance of profit. However, the purchase of collateral can deal with 
the issue of mispricing in a more direct way, not financing overly risky banks gambling on a bail 
out by the government. A way to counter the problem of supporting toxic assets could be to 
support rather less toxic assets, which then as a consequence would increase the chance of further 
lending and reduce potential government losses. 
  
The buying of assets during a fire sale has been seen in a suspicious way by economists. A 
government buying busses or airplanes during a fire sales seems rare. However, the purchase of 
financial assets is an entirely different issue. Financial markets have a strong influence on markets 
for real goods, as they provide the capital for entrepreneurship. Therefore, there is a higher interest 
of a government to interfere in a financial market. A government would also never be as efficient 
as the private sector in holding airplanes and leading them for a good price. On the other hand it 
can be argued that the Central Bank of a country is at least roughly efficient in purchasing 
financial positions and can also avoid buying “lemons” by only buying relatively safe assets. 
However, it cannot be said with certainty that only buying assets with a low risk will be enough to 
stop the fire sale. Very often assets that carry a very high-risk rather then low-risk assets are sold 
in a fire sale. This problem is however very hard to combat while the fire sale is already ongoing. 
Also depending on the size of the fire sale, it must be determined if the government is even 
financially capable of purchasing enough shares to stop the cascade. 
  
Obviously the government can never know if an asset is cheap or if the price is just the 
reflection of the risk behind that asset. But since the financial crisis started in 2008 with the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, it has been quite evident that illiquidity was the problem. For 
example “10-year government agency bonds that the Fed ended up buying were yielding up to 170 
basis points more than similar duration Treasury bonds. This compares to a normal spread on   9
agency paper of 10 to 30 basis points. In many other markets, wide credit spreads for the highest 
quality borrowers pointed to illiquidity rather than fundamental problems.” The Federal Reserve 
witnessed the crash of financial papers and repo markets, which pushed buyers that would have 
naturally bought such positions out of the market. They however, did rely on these markets in 
order to be able to purchase risky debt.  This is another argument that the problem was illiquidity 
caused by fire sales rather then pure insolvency. 
 
During the financial crisis, the response of the US government to fire sales had various 
forms. On the one hand side the government bailed out some banks and other financial institutions 
but on the other hand side, it also provided cash against risky collateral and purchase some 
financial positions. Before the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in 2008, the general reaction 
was the provision of liquidity. The year after debt of agencies was essential. It is very hard to tell 
which of the strategies was the relevant one to stop the direct crisis in the beginning of 2009. One 
thing however can be said: the pure injections of liquidity and the saving of several financial 
institutions in 2008 was not enough to stop the cascade. 
  
The complementary combination of hard preventive policies to avoid fire sales and softer 
policies during the ongoing of a fire sale seems to be an effective possibility. Generally it can be 
advised strongly to governments to interfere in the market while fire sales are ongoing. Otherwise, 
severe harms to the financial market and its lending capacity and thus the whole economy are 
probable. Soft advisable policies such as purchasing mispriced securities directly or supporting the 
purchase of those by market participants must be accompanied by measures that reduce the risk of 
a fire sale even occurring. This seems to be the better option than supporting financial institutions 




The effects of financial shocks are very negative for the financial system and even the real 
economy. The financial system is, unlike the real economy, highly based on trust and confidence 
and on the other side on fear and anxiety. This is especially the case, as the financial system is 
based highly on the leverage effect. The vast use of money that is not owned by one enables 
financial actors to generate profits that are far beyond the possibilities they would have had, of   10
they only used their own money. However, when things go wrong, this high level of leverage can 
cause severe problems for the debtor and cause him to sell assets at a highly dislocated price, 
harming the system around him.  
 
To prevent this, or at least to reduce the risk of a fire sale and to minimize its effect while it 
is ongoing, the most important point is to reduce the level of leverage used in the market. Most 
policies and measures presented above are in a way intending to increase the amount of capital an 
institution has to hold. If this capital is present in a liquid form, it can reduce the negative effects 
of a fire sale a great deal and, depending on the amount, might even prevent it. The idea of holding 
security capital in a liquid form that is not used to generate profits by investing it, is against the 
idea of arbitrageurs. Therefore, they to not have a real incentive to just hold capital for the case of 
a crisis because they see all the lost potential profits. And as they do not consider the harm they 
are causing for others in the case of a fire sale, they are engaging into that risky behaviour.  
 
This behaviour must be regulated by the state, forcing the leverage to go down. The risk of a 
fire sale can never be eliminated fully, even if there would be no leverage at all, and lending 
would be forbidden. But, the likelihood can be reduced and the effects can be limited if more own 
capital is used by financial actors. Therefore, the policies presented above are pointing into the 
right direction. Even, if in the short term negative effects can only be eliminated by supporting 
poorly managed institutions and buying toxic assets in the short term, in the long term by 
introducing an insurance or simply reducing the amount of money that banks are allowed to 
create, the systemic risk will be reduced. As the systemic risk could be seen as a classis market 
failure, only the state can and must regulate the risky financial behaviour and when trying to 
reduce the leverage and discouraging highly risky financial behaviour, it will be successful. A 
radical reduction of the leverage would most likely not be possible in the short run as the system is 
too dependent on credit, but over the time, the capital ratios can be increase, reducing the chance 
of a fire sale and thus minimising systemic risk.  
 
However, even though the measures and policies are most likely effective, the question 
arises how they could be implemented in order to have a real effect? How many governments of 
how many states would need to implement such measures simultaneously for them to actually 
regulate the global financial system? Furthermore, the role of the high-frequency traders in fire   11
sales and the systemic risk and the possibility to regulate them must be evaluated. This however 
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